FP-1 gives Ukraine volume. FP-2 brings a heavier warhead closer to the front. FP-5 Flamingo moves a one-tonne-class charge into Russia's industrial depth.
As of 7 July 2026, the public record has a clear shape: long range, uneven terminal effect, and a manufacturer facing critical contracts and integrity questions. This update adds the claimed strike on Titan-Barrikady in Volgograd and the context of Ukraine's 40-day campaign to apply pressure deep inside Russia. [1] [2] [36] [37]
It has changed reach and warhead mass. Consistency remains unproved in public. Ukraine has shown it can send a heavy missile beyond 1,500 km and, on 27 June, claimed an FP-5 strike on the Titan-Barrikady complex in Volgograd. The OSINT record adds the colder half of the story: many filmed launches, few clean hits. [1] [8] [36]
Fire Point produces FP-1 and FP-5; Ukrainian authorities have claimed FP-5 strikes inside Russia. [2] [6] [8]
Claims of 1,500 km-plus reach are supported by official statements, footage and local reporting; the Cheboksary and Volgograd entries remain separate from the mature satellite sample. [8] [9] [36]
The FP line works like a ladder: cheap mass drone, heavier shorter-range drone, large cruise missile, then ballistic systems with publicly reported 2026 tests and parameters. The shared principle is cost low enough to try again. [2] [3] [7] [12] [13]
| System | Role | Public range | Payload / warhead | Evidence level |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| FP-1 | deep-strike drone The workhorse: plywood, quick assembly, rail launch. The military credits it with about 59% of deep-strike missions. [26] | 1.400–1.600 km | 60–120 kg | used at scale [2] [3] |
| FP-2 | medium-range strike drone Same production logic, shorter range, heavier punch. | 200 km; upgrade claim 370 km | 105 kg; upgrade claim 200 kg | public debut + manufacturer claims [12] [13] |
| FP-5 | Flamingo, cruise missile Six tonnes, refurbished turbojet engine, heavy warhead. | 3,000 km declared | 1,150 kg declared | combat use, mixed public effects [1] [2] [4] |
| FP-7 | tactical ballistic missile + FP-7.X interceptor variant Two known flight tests: February and 3 June 2026, the second being the first fully guided flight. The FP-7.X variant underpins the planned Freyja interceptor. | 200 km declared (strike) | 150 kg declared | filmed flight tests; the rest, claims [7] [25] [27] |
| FP-9 | heavy ballistic missile Shown in presentations and company claims; Le Monde wrote on 3 July 2026 that no official Ukrainian source had confirmed a ballistic launch. | 855 km declared | 800 kg claimed | maker claims; tests announced for summer 2026 [25] [37] [38] |
Flamingo matters because of its compromises: a refurbished AI-25TL turbojet associated with the L-39 trainer, a simple glass-fibre body, large fixed wings and trailer launch with a booster. Less refinement means more warhead mass and faster production. [2] [4] [5]
Fire Point says the first engines came from decommissioned stocks, acceptable for a weapon built to fly once. The vulnerability follows from the same choice: engine supply, fuel burn at very low altitude and the visible signature of a large fixed-wing missile. [4] [5]
Hence the Milanion episode: six months before the reveal, an identical mock-up, also named FP-5, appeared at IDEX 2025 on the stand of the British-Emirati Milanion group. Shtilerman claims it was a "special operation" to mask the quiet worldwide buy-up of AI-25 engines; the IISS notes, however, that Milanion's real role remains unclear. The company's version remains a version. [5] [4]
The improvisation has a shelf life, and the company knows it: it is developing its own engine, designed for low-level flight where the AI-25 is inefficient, and building in Denmark, next to Skrydstrup air base, the first Ukrainian arms factory on NATO territory, for the solid fuel of Flamingo boosters and planned ballistic missiles. The Danish government suspended more than 20 laws to speed up construction. [35] [24]
The same campaign looks different depending on what you accept as proof: official claim, OSINT reconstruction or visible satellite impact. Change the threshold and watch the ledger contract.
FP-5 launches captured in public footage up to the 3 May analysis. The visible story begins here; the full military assessment remains closed to the public.
The list combines the 3 May analysis with the 10 June Cheboksary and 27 June Volgograd updates. For older entries, the verdict follows mainly the Ukrainska Pravda / Dnipro OSINT analysis. For the 10 and 27 June entries, the verdict stays provisional until satellite imagery and independent assessment mature. [1] [8] [9] [36]
launched ≥3 · arrived 1 · hits 0
First combat appearance. At least one missile reached the target area, then missed and fell into the water near the base. Ukrainian media initially reported a successful strike, with a demolished building and six hovercraft destroyed; Russia's independent Astra confirmed the attack but tentatively attributed the damage to a Neptune missile. Satellite imagery shows a damaged building without clarifying which weapon hit it. [1] [31]
launched ≥4 · arrived 0 · hits 0
The General Staff then confirmed, for the first time, combat use of Flamingo alongside Bars missiles and Liutyi drones in a combined strike on Crimea (the Feodosia oil terminal, Kirovske airfield, a radar near Yevpatoria) and on "facilities on the territory of the Russian Federation". At the Oryol power plant, FP-5's apparent target, satellite imagery found no impact traces; the missiles appear intercepted, one probable shoot-down was filmed and debris fell among apartment blocks. [1] [32]
launched ≥4 · arrived 1 · hits 0
A strike on Site No. 105, the launch point for Russia's Oreshnik missiles. A single missile reached the area and fell by the perimeter fence, either intercepted on approach or simply missing; the crater is visible from satellite. The range was hit in that period, but CyberBoroshno analysts attribute that damage to drones, not missiles. [1]
launched ≥6 · arrived 1 · hits 1
A target sized to the warhead: hardened ammunition bunkers out of reach of ordinary drones. Of six missiles launched, one penetrated a 1,200 m² bunker; the ammunition detonated and the building was destroyed. A one-in-six ratio, but the kind of damage a $55,000 FP-1 cannot inflict. [1]
launched ≥3 · arrived 1 · hits 1
The programme's most serious result: the plant producing Iskander-M, Yars, Bulava and Kinzhal missiles. One missile struck Building 19, the electroplating and stamping workshop, a basic link in forming missile bodies; the General Staff later confirmed the destruction of workshop No. 22, and local footage captured the impact. In that account, Shtilerman called it the longest Flamingo strike, about 1,400 km. The OSINT tally for the same night: one of three missiles arrived. The full consequences for production remain unknown. [1] [6] [29] [30]
launched ≥3 · arrived 2 · hits 0
Two of three missiles reached the plant making explosive components for Russian munitions, but neither struck the intended building: both fell near the workshops, either intercepted at the last moment or deflected, possibly even by a lightning rod. The textbook case for the missile's real problem: it arrives, but does not hit the required point. [1]
launched 6 (in official video) · hits satellite-confirmed
The plant makes Kometa GNSS antennas used in Shahed drones, Iskander-M and Kalibr missiles and UMPK glide kits. The missile struck the facade of the main building, whose anti-drone netting was useless against a one-tonne-class warhead; a major fire followed, then a second wave of Liutyi drones. Zelenskyy published the launch footage, the first presidential acknowledgement of a Flamingo strike, also revealing the unit: the 19th Missile Brigade "Saint Barbara". Missile alerts sounded in 18 regions, for the first time including Khanty-Mansiysk, 2,000 km from the border. [33] [34]
launched ? · hits officially confirmed, satellite pending
On 10 June 2026, the General Staff confirmed that the Rocket Forces and Artillery had struck VNIIR-Progress again with FP-5 Flamingo: "the hit on the target and the fire on the plant's territory are confirmed". Zelenskyy confirmed it too, alongside strikes on the Kuibyshevsky refinery in Samara and a shadow-fleet tanker. Monitoring channels filmed the missiles in flight; the plant had meanwhile been covered with camouflage netting. Without an independent satellite assessment included in this ledger, the entry stays "developing". [8] [9] [10] [11]
launched ? · hits officially claimed, local damage confirmed
Zelenskyy wrote that FP-5 Flamingo missiles hit the Titan-Barrikady complex, described as producing artillery systems and specialised military equipment, including launch-system components. Ukraine's General Staff pointed to equipment for Iskander-M, including self-propelled launchers and transport-loading vehicles. Governor Andrei Bocharov confirmed an attack on a business in the Krasnooktyabrsky district: ten wounded and damaged production facilities, without naming the company. Without independent satellite assessment, this entry remains "developing". [36]
Ukraine says it fields a domestic weapon able to hit Russian military industry at ranges once limited by allied politics. Votkinsk, Cheboksary and Volgograd belong in that file. [6] [8] [36]
Analysts linking launch footage, trajectories and satellite imagery see a real weapon, with some important results and many cases of interception, miss or insufficiently proven effect. [1]
"All the missiles that were launched reached the target. I believe this is the key success: it shows high quality and accuracy," Zelenskyy said on 25 February after Votkinsk, adding that Russia is "hunting" the Flamingo production sites. The OSINT tally for the same night: one of three missiles arrived. [20] [1]
"They made a lot of promises, both about the number of these missiles and the quality of their use. The statements and the real-world use differ significantly," defence-committee MP Serhii Rakhmanin said on 8 June, describing a weapon "used rarely and not very successfully" despite "very aggressive promotion". [21]
Fire Point is a critical supplier and an integrity problem. If FP-1 and FP-5 become central to Ukraine's strike campaign, ownership, cost and delivery become military questions. [14] [15]
Ukrainian reporting says NABU is examining whether Fire Point inflated costs or deliveries to the Defence Ministry and whether it has links to Tymur Mindich. NABU has separately said Flamingo production is outside the probe. [14]
Operation Midas breaks: a $100 million kickback scheme around Energoatom and defence procurement. Mindich leaves for Israel; nine people are charged. One of the scheme's alleged "cashiers", Ihor Fursenko, was formally on Fire Point's payroll. The company denies any link to Mindich and says he asked to buy shares and was refused. [22]
Ukrainska Pravda and two MPs publish transcripts of new recordings from the case, not authenticated by NABU. In them, Mindich allegedly complains to then defence minister Rustem Umerov about Fire Point's underfunding, discusses selling a 33% stake with a $300 million cash-out, and is treated as the de facto owner. A figure of Hr 311 billion (about $7 billion) for the company's products also appears; both the firm and the Defence Procurement Agency deny it. Mindich sues MP Zhelezniak for defamation. On 29 April, the Defence Ministry's anti-corruption watchdog calls for an audit and the company's nationalisation. [23] [15]
The Kyiv Independent describes Fire Point as a crucial supplier and a company caught in the largest corruption scandal of Zelenskyy's tenure. Supporters see an attack on defence capacity; critics call for audits, clearer rules and protection for useful production. [15]
Fire Point denies everything: it says the probe targets officials, not the company, that prices reflect real wartime costs, and that the whole campaign is "an attack on Ukraine's defence that benefits Russia". The firm cooperates with investigators, brought former US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo onto its advisory board, and presents its Danish solid-fuel plant near Skrydstrup air base as proof it passes a NATO state's integrity tests. No one at Fire Point has been charged; Umerov and former presidential chief of staff Andrii Yermak are under investigation but not charged. [15] [26] [24]
In air defence, interception cost can matter as much as interception rate. Cheap drones and rarer missiles force defenders to allocate sensors and interceptors across a wide area. [16]
The Financial Times described FP-7.x as the interceptor for the wider Freyja system, and the Guardian reported on 26 June 2026 that Fire Point had signed a memorandum with Hensoldt for the TRML-4D radar and was preparing FP-9 tests for summer 2026. [19] [37]
If Cheboksary 10 June, Volgograd 27 June or later cases show clear penetration of target workshops, FP-5 moves from episodic signal to repeatable instrument. [36]
Sources are working material. For FP-5 strikes, the key base remains the analysis linking public launch footage to satellite imagery; for 10 and 27 June, the file remains developing.